technologies as communication medium advance and expand across the globe, cyber attacks also grow accordingly. Anomaly detection systems (ADSs) are employed to scrutinize information such as packet behaviours coming from various locations on network to find those intrusive activities as fast as possible with precision. Unfortunately, besides minimizing false alarms; the performance issues related to heavy computational process has become drawbacks to be resolved in this kind of detection systems. In this work, a novel Signature-Based Anomaly Detection Scheme (SADS) which could be applied to scrutinize packet headers' behaviour patterns more precisely and promptly is proposed. Integratingdata mining classifiers such as Naive Bayes and Random Forest can beutilized to decrease false alarms as well as generate signatures based on detection resultsfor future prediction and reducing processing time. Results from a number of experiments using DARPA 1999 and ISCX 2012 benchmark dataset have validated that SADS own better detection capabilities with lower processing duration as contrast to conventional anomaly-based detection method.
INTRODUCTION
Security threats on Internet and computer systems have increased drastically as a number of cyberattacks exponentially grow. Thus, discovery on anomaly-based detection has been geared extensively and considered as a challenging task for research communities in the area. Although anomaly-based detection system have been incessantly enhanced, differentiating genuine and attack behaviour remains a big challenge [1] .
These inspire the endless research or exploration in the field of data mining algorithm in identifying attack behaviour [2] . Unfortunately, in recent years, packet header behaviour has also become a dangerous menace for computer and network system when the data mining based anomaly protection system is unable to distinguish genuine and attack behaviour more accurately [3] in view of the fact of rapidly emerging attacks, thus contributes in high false alarm [4] . These shortcomings not merely make the aforementioned genuine and attack behaviour undetectable but also result in heavy computational performance when the anomaly detection system consume more time to discover the pattern of the packet.
In order to overcome the abovementioned drawbacks, we propose a novel Signature-based Anomaly Detection Scheme (SADS) which could be applied to scrutinize packet headers behaviour patterns more precisely and promptly. Integrated Data Mining (DM) classifiers between Naive Bayes (NB) and Random Forest (RF) are utilized to minimize false alarm as well as to generate signatures based on detection result for future prediction and reducing processing time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related work in Section II. Section III theoretically presents the proposed detection method. The efficiency of the proposed detection scheme is proven by evaluation through several benchmark datasets in Section IV. Finally, Section Vsummarizes this paper and outlines the future work.
II. RELATEDWORK
Anomaly-based detection which utilizes data mining approaches as detection method is explored significantly as security scheme against network threats. Different kind of information used for intrusion detection (i.e. traffic, logs, system calls, etc.). Anomaly-based detection usually uses information such as log files, audit data and packet content to perform intrusion detection. Scrutinizing log files and audit data for intrusion detection can increase accuracy rate at maximum level. Unfortunately, while this scrutiny takes place the attack may occur before this information become available to other intrusion detection activity. Thus, instead of examining log files, some researchers generally prefer to analyze packet information for faster intrusion detection [5] .
Difficulties in manually constructing the attack signatures and normal behaviour characteristicsmotivateresearchers to apply data mining approach which is capable to discover those 978-1-4799-6444-4/14/$31.00 ©2014 IEEE patterns automatically. Moreover, this method is widely applied due to its strength in detecting normal behaviour more correctly, which directly contributes in reducing false positives [3] .
In this section, we focus only on the works which use packet information and data mining method to perform anomaly detection for the aforesaid reason. Data mining has the capability of discovering unfamiliar properties in data, enabling this detection method to identify previously unseen patterns.
The prominent and commonly employed data mining method in the field of anomaly detection system comprises of Naïve Bayes (NB), Decision Tree (DT), Neural Network (NN), Support Vector Machine (SVM) and so forth. These methods have been the focus of research interests since they produce detection results that are easilyunderstandable. However, even though each method has their own strengths in detecting specific attacks, there are also constraints or drawbacks in several detection methods, usually involving increases in time taken for building a model (in processing large volume of input data,and also, in certain algorithm, in generating huge number of models) and tendencies in misclassifying input data (i.e. high rate of falsely detectable data and low rate of correctly detectable data). On the other hand, although several methods require longer time, they generally may achieve better accuracies due tomore detail data analyses through calculation or mathematic procedures. For example, based on experiments, the Naïve Bayes classifier is faster than Decision Tree in generating a model, while Decision Tree has better accuracy compared to Naïve Bayes. Thus, researchers began to discover and introduce combinational methods, where two or more classifiers are integrated to achieve better performance as these methods complement each other [6] . The significant works on different level classification system have been proposed by [7] with a sequence of multi-stage classification system which could be a solution to overcome intrusion detection drawbacks on false alarms. Different classifiers and reliability-based threshold mechanism with different stages are created to identify specific attack types. Therefore, each stage functioned as a binary classifier with a specific set of reduced features in splitting the normal and single attack classes. Moreover, the system assumes data as normal merely if the entire stage does not identify it as an intrusion. This practise could reduce the volume of false alarm and undetected attacks. Thus, for this purpose, the performance of a single neural layer classifier called Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ) and three neural layers called Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) have been tested and evaluated. MLP performs significantly better in reducing false alarm as compared to LVQ.
Multiple Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are merged in an aim to identify anomalies residing in series of system calls [8] . In this approach, a volume of diverse hidden states is applied to train every single HMM which is capable to capture dissimilar data temporal structures. Subsequently, the entire multiple HMM responses are merged inside Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) space based on the Maximum Realizable ROC (MRROC) approach. The performance of this method is evaluated in different artificial (mock) HIDS based datasets and have shown an improvement as compared to single HMM as well as conventional ordered matching method namely STIDE.
Various integrated classifiers method for modelling IDSsare employed in [9] , which claimed that individual methods could regularly give more errors compared to ensemble method, and by integrating multiple methods those errors could be reduced. Subsequently, the entire attacks could be detected and directly contribute to achieve better levels of accuracy and false alarm reduction as proven in their experiments.
A collection of patterns or conditions which pinpoints a recognized threat is called "Signature" in IDS. These signatures are frequently accurate to detect specific threats and therefore become costly to compute in various detection systems. In order to overcome false positive drawbacks, these detection systems normally use a single signature for each attack vector where every single signature represents a sequence of possibly expensive computations. On the other hand, the entire signature is required to be maintained as unsophisticated and as compact as possible for performance reason, asminimum signature size will permit the detection system works efficiently under heavy networks loads. Consequently, the signatures could be in the form of easilyunderstandable structure for the task of identifications of attack activities. Signature-based approaches could be utilized in examining incoming traffic (packets) for the purpose of "seeing" the relevant features that contribute to potential vulnerabilities such as ports, IP addresses, protocols and so forth that are mostly obtained from packet headers information and payloads.
Unfortunately, these kind of detection methods have been lately disregarded for the reason of unavailability of adaptive mechanism which could allow unseen attacks to be continuously undetected [2] ⎯minimizing the size of signatures may reduce some features to be examined that consequently made these detection systems not sufficient enough to identify variants of threats more correctly, and employing huge signature sets could cover various fractions of the unseen threats but tend to increase processing workloads. Moreover, even with small amount of signatures, the resulting alerts are too manyto be analysed by security analysts.
These challenges could be overcome if the qualities of signature-based detection such as utilizing attack behaviours signature forms in detecting attacks are induced into anomalybased detection. In addition, the new signatures for unseen attack behaviours need to be frequently created and these creations should be done automatically with less human intervention in order to overcome time-consumption issues. Using this approach, the detection system may attain the benefit of signature-based detection in having high detection rate for observed attacks as well as the proficiency of the anomaly-based detection system in identifying unseen attack behaviours. Thus, we propose a Signature-Based Anomaly Detection Scheme (SADS) to overcome the abovementioned drawbacks and the detail regarding the proposed method is covered in the next section.
III. SIGNATURE-BASED ANAMOLY DETECTION SYSTEM
A number of intrusion detection methods such as SignatureBased Detection System (SDS) and Anomaly-Based Detection Systems (ADS) have been discovered to detect an intrusion behavior through the network packets. The most popular approach, SDS completely containsmany conventional information of known attack patterns and utilized a data mining method or algorithm to detect possible attacks. Although these detection methods are exceedingly capable to identify known cyber attack effectively, their detection capabilities are imperfect when faced with unknown attack patterns [2] . In contrast, ADS prevail over this problem by assuming the abnormal behavior as suspicious or anomalies when those behavior deviates from normal behavior model. Unfortunately, conventional ADS scheme consumes high computational time in performing intrusion detection and regularly havehigh rates of false alarms [2] .
In order to overcome these drawbacks, a Signature-Based Anomaly Detection System (SADS) is proposed. SADS has the ability to examine packet headers' behaviour patterns more precisely and promptly. Naive Bayes (NB) and Random Forest (RF) classifiers are integrated and employed to minimize false alarms as well as to generate signatures to be used for future prediction and reducing processing time. Generally, aclassifieris a data mining process that defines and differentiates data class labels more accurately to identified feature value in which the class value is cannot be determined [6] .
A Naïve Bayes (NB) classifier has been utilized in various works to resolve classification drawbacks (i.e. false alarms, low level accuracy and detection rate). Generally, NB classifier is an uncomplicated probability classifier based on independent or rational assumption, Bayes theorem, and independent characteristic model. NBis easy to implement and applied, and also capable to handle continuous data and missing attribute values [6] . An arrangement of features (attributes) usually appointed to an order of classes in NB classification task based on Bayes theorem as in Eq. (1). The objective for calculating each class probability is to get the conditional probability for a given order of experiential features.
P(S|f) = P(f|S).P(S) / P(f)
(1)
The posterior probability P(S| f), the probability of class for a given experiential features,is normally utilized to discover the class for specific features. P(S) is also known as prior probability in Bayes Theorem. Bayes rule is simplified in Eq. (2) by removing P(f)for the fact that this value is always constant for every single class.
The probability vector of the features given the class P(f|S)is expressive with an order of features f 1 , f 2 ,… f n .The features probability fi are independent for the given class Si. Moreover, the combined probabilities of the entire order of features are conditional on class S as the product of the entire clusters of independent probabilities. Thus, the entire data have been classified into binary classes (S1 = Normal and S2 = Attack) in this work. However, the accuracy of the NB could be decreased due to the occurrence of noisy or outlier's data [3] . Thus, the Random Forest algorithm is further applied (fusion) in minimizing the effect from those circumstances.
Random Forest (RF) [10] fuses more than one Decision Trees, and extractsa single tree to produce a prediction. Therefore, RFcan be viewed as an ensemble learning method where various models are employed to achieve finer prognostic performance. Decision Trees are composed by utilizing bagging classification trees [11] , in which prediction is taken into account based on the majority vote of the trees that are composed independently with random samples, and each node is dividedbased on a subset of finer predictors that is randomly selected at that node.
The main improvement and strength of RF is its robustness in overcoming drawbacks of overfitting and can provide a solution of constantly converging large volume of trees. Moreover, this method is efficient due its capabilities during tree creation, where the pruning stage isremoved and the searching process is performed only with a small set. This facilitates in having a single tree which could have better performance [12] . The characteristic of RF algorithm utilized in this work involves three different steps as follows: a. Get s random samples to be applied as tree seeds from the dataset.
b. For every single seed, grow up an un-pruned classification tree while for every single node, select p predictors randomly which have the best separation between them. c. Select the majority-voted prediction tree as final predictors from various generated trees. Figure 1 illustrates the SADS model. SADS comprises of several stages for training and testing phase. There is two major phases involved in this detection model i.e. training phase and testing phase.
In the training phase, a dataset comprises of attack and normal behaviours isused to train the integrated NB+RF algorithm. In the first algorithm, NB, the entire data is classified with pre-specified label and these preprocessed data are induced to the RF algorithm for further classification. The verified true positive behaviors in distinct attack patternsare extracted based on the NB+RF outcome. Subsequently, this attack pattern is computed as a signature and stored in the signature database as in process Stage 1.1 in Fig.1 for future prediction against fresh entry packets (testing data). Moreover, the aim to use such signatures is to reduce detection time if similar attack behaviours are encountered again. The signatures are computed based on the distinct value of attributes from each packet where each signature represents unique behaviours of packets and can be regularly streamlined (updated).
The testing phase involves more stages compared to the training phase and the detection capabilities of the approach are usually assessed in this phase. In testing procedure in the conventional method,the processes engaged in training procedure need to be re-computed for detection even though the attack behavior has been examined during training. In contrast, such re-computation could be bypassedfor attacks that have been detected in the training phase and the attack signatures are available for detection, as proposed in SADS. For example, based on Stage 2.0 in Figure 1 , if the attack signature exists or matches a particular behavior of packet pattern, a detection alarm is raise as in Stage 2.1. In other words, each incoming packet needs to go throughStage 2.0 and Stage 2.1, but not required to proceed to Stage 3.0 (trained model)if the packet behavior matches any of the available signatures. However, in case none exist or the signature is not available, Stage 3.0 is needs to be performed. Recently zero-day attacks, i.e. unseen attacks with no signatures created yet may cause huge damages for network services. Thus, by considering these phenomena, unknown behaviours (unseen or unobservable packet patterns) are inputted into the integrated algorithm inStage 3.0 for performing intrusion detection. Signatures for particular attack behaviours will be created based on the learned output and stored in the signature database as shown in Stage 3.1 while at the same time producing detection alarm as in Stage 3.2. In specific, Stage 3.1 and Stage 3.2 involve a procedure to maintain signatures or update newly discovered signatures and raise an alarm if a new attack is detected. The effectiveness of this detection system has been evaluated through a series of experiments in the next section.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULT
The effectiveness of Signature-Based Anomaly Detection Scheme (SADS) and conventional anomaly-based detection system (CADS) have been evaluated through the DARPA 1999 and ISCX 2012 Intrusion Detection Evaluation benchmark datasets. These well-known datasets are generally suitable for developing and appraising the anomaly-based detection method due to the fact that DARPA 1999 contains more attack types while ISCX 2012 contains the latest attacks.
The entire DARPA 1999 dataset [13] contains millions of captured packets within a period of five weeks with 28 packet header features and four major categories of attacks (i.e. R2L, U2R, DOS and Probe). Due to this, the incoming and outgoing Fig. 1 Signature-based anomaly intrusion detection scheme model packets only to/from a single machine (172.016.112.050) are used for the experiment in this study. A huge number of attackpackets is covered in Week 4 and Week 5 while Week 1 and Week 3 do not contain any attacks, and Week 2 is believed to be inappropriate for designing anomaly detection system due to the absence of ending time feature. Thus, Week 4 and Week 5 data were selected as training set and testing set, respectively as shown in Table I . The totalnumber of packets used in the experiment is 2,566,547, where the training portion comprisesof 715,040 normal packets and 114,146 attack packets while the testing portion comprises of 614,953 normal packets and 1,122,408 attack packets, respectively. DARPA 1999 dataset have been used to evaluate ananomaly detection model using data mining approach in [14] , where redundant features are removed in the valuation process in order to decrease theireffects on the preciseness. Therefore, in anomaly detection, using dominant or important features could express the precise pattern of packets compared to those using irrelevant or recessive features. Inspired by their work, the experiments were conducted with the same significant features of headers.
On the other hand, the entire ISCX 2012 [15] evaluation dataset contains approximately more than one million network trace packets and 20 features, where the data have been labeled into two classes (normal or attack) and captured in a period of seven days. Packet headers of those traces are extracted to be used in the experiments and one of the challenging tasks is to manually partition the data into training and testing sets. Thus, packet headers on specific days are selected as training and testing data as presented in Table II . The total packets used in the experiment are 1,217,794, where the training portion comprises of 465,906 normal packets and 18,104 attack packets, while the testing portion is made of 687,778 normal packets and 46,006 attack packets, respectively.
Since both datasets are only labeled, values for indicators such as false positive or false alarm (denotes legitimate behavior identified as intrusion), false negative (denotes intrusion behavior identified as legitimate behavior), true positive (intrusion behavior correctly identified as intrusion) and true negative (legitimate behavior correctly identified as legitimate) are computed and used to assess the detection method. 
A. Result for Darpa 1999 Dataset
In this section, the effectiveness of conventional anomalybased detection system (CADS) and the proposed system namely Signature-Based Anomaly Detection Scheme (SADS) have been evaluated under different criteria (i.e. false alarm generated per-day, computing duration, and capabilities in processing packets in one second) using the DARPA 1999 dataset. Each sigle packet for each day needs to be examined through integrated data mining method called NB+RF classifier in CADS, while in SADS the examining processes for known attack behavior is unnecessary once the prior attack signature for this behavior is available (in the signature database) for future detection. Consequently, the volume of packets which are inspected through NB+RF for each day varries between CADS and SADS, and SADS have performed better in reducing false alarm for each day as contrast to CADS as shown in TablesIII. For example, for the 5th day the CADS has generated eight false alarms while SADS generates only two false alarms. Based on TablesIV, the computational duration for CADS is considerably 10259.65 sec, which is higher than SADS's 8067.79 sec. As a consequence, SADS is capable of processing an average of 169 packets/sec. while CADS approximately 214 packets/sec (Table  V) . (Table VII) hasoutperformed CADS in reducing false alarms for day-15th. For instance, for the 14th day the CADS have generated one false alarm while SADS without any false alarm. Based on investigation, some of the normal behaviour data which look similar to attack behaviours have been detected as attack by NB+RF classifiers. Thus, in case of day 15th, both SADS and CADS have generated quite high false alarms. In addition, even though SADS and CADS computational time have not shown huge differences,with 1589.62 sec. for SADS and 1612.47 sec. for CADS (TablesVIII), but SADS is capable to process more packets (i.e. additional seven packets) compared to CADS, as in TableIX. The results from various experiments indicate that the SADS scheme can effectively detect critical and modern-day attack behaviors better than CADS. Moreover, in automated detection developments, this kind of detection scheme could offer significant reference for initial attack detection as contrast to the conventional scheme.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work focuses on detecting familiar and unfamiliar attack behavior more precisely, include reducing the computation duration that remaining as imperative influence in conventional anomaly-based detection system (CADS). A novel SignatureBased Anomaly Detection Scheme (SADS) is proposed to counterattack the aforesaid issues. An integrated classification algorithm of Naïve Bayes (NB) and Random Forest (RF) has been used to improve the identification rate of attack and normal behavior as well as to generate attack signature to expedite future detection. The experiment result demonstrates that the detection capabilities and duration of the proposed method is more significant to be employed as intrusion detection scheme in contrast to conventional anomaly-based detection system (CADS). Possible future works could consider integrating signature-based detection (also known as misuse detection) and SADS for better detection capabilities and automated detection.
